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**REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE COUNCIL**

**2025 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATION (EC) N°
300/2008 ON COMMON RULES IN THE FIELD OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY**

1. INTRODUCTION

According to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹, the Commission shall every year present a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Member States informing them of the application of this Regulation and of its impact on improving aviation security.

In 2025, the Commission services continued the implementation of the actions announced in the Commission Staff Working Document “Working towards an enhanced and more resilient aviation security policy: a stocktaking” (SWD (2023) 37 final), with a focus on innovation, technology, and a new aviation security baseline.

2. THREAT EVENTS AND OUTLOOK

The Commission, with the relevant agencies, engaged in a sustained effort to monitor and address security threats to the aviation sector, including those of a hybrid nature, together with Member States and other stakeholders. The aim of this endeavour was to ensure the effective management of risk. To this end, the Commission prepared a legislative amendment in 2025 to establish a more efficient mechanism to share information on aviation security occurrences.

2.1 Terrorism and hybrid threats

The terrorist threat to the European Union and its Member States remains persistent, evolving, and increasingly complex, characterised by decentralisation, ideological diversification, and a strong reliance on digital ecosystems. Jihadist networks remain the most lethal threat, with their evolution closely influenced by ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. At the same time, destabilising internal and external events have contributed to the intensification of radicalisation, enhanced tension and social polarisation, potentially leading to terrorism and violent extremism across the Union. Digital platforms play a key role, enabling radicalisation and recruitment as well as propaganda dissemination. In an environment that is more decentralised and volatile, diffuse terrorist and violent extremist actors connect and inspire one another beyond ideology or group affiliation.

The influence of the conflicts in the Middle East have extended to the hybrid threat space with the exploitation of conflict narratives in disinformation campaigns and online polarisation efforts.

Civil aviation remains a high-profile target, while threats and challenges are expected to evolve, with likely increased diversity of *modi operandi* of attack. Insider threats and

¹ Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 (OJ L 97, 9.4.2008, p. 72).

home-grown terrorism remain an area of particular attention. Conflict zones will continue to provide terrorists with an environment offering the opportunity to acquire more sophisticated military grade equipment.

While the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine has so far had a limited impact on the terrorist threat and violent extremism in the EU, it has led to an increased hybrid threat against the EU's internal security, via an increase in disinformation, cyberattacks, attempts to instrumentalise migration, and sabotage actions against critical infrastructure.

2.2 Cybersecurity

2.2.1 General

There were about 9200 cyber incidents reported in 2025 that affected all categories of aviation stakeholders worldwide.² The nature of these incidents included ransomware incidents, data breaches, supply-chain compromises, hacktivist-driven activity and data-leak disclosures targeting airlines, as well as airports and air navigation service providers. 2025 witnessed several incidents with significant impact on the aviation supply chain, notably the attack on Collins Aerospace's MUSE system which affected multiple major airports³ in Europe.

Though cybercrime remains the main threat, the geopolitical dimension of cyber threats has become increasingly prominent. The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have continued to fuel hacktivist activities, with DDoS attacks disproportionately targeting airports for their symbolic visibility. The use of AI by cyber threat actors has also become increasingly apparent.

To support a coherent and harmonised implementation of the EU cybersecurity framework across the aviation domain, efforts in 2025 focused on maximum consistency between horizontal and sectoral rules. This with a view to enhance effectiveness, avoid duplication and reduce burden on operators and administrations.

The Aviation Cybersecurity Subgroup set up in February 2024 completed in 2025 a non-binding reference document, validated by the NIS cooperation group, to support a coherent and harmonised implementation of the EU cybersecurity framework across the aviation domain.

² EUROCONTROL/EATM-CERT 2026 report on cyber in aviation.

³ As a consequence, these airports had to resort to manual processing, resulting in long queues, delays, and cancellations. The incident demonstrates how critical aviation IT-systems can suffer large-scale outages with rapid knock-on effects across Europe's flight network.

2.2.2 Risk assessment on detection equipment

In collaboration with the Member State's aviation security and customs authorities, the Commission conducted a risk assessment on detection equipment, including aviation screening equipment, under Article 22 of the NIS2 Directive. The risk assessment applied to detection equipment that uses software and/or is connected to ICT systems, deployed across customs, border authorities, airports, ports, and border control points.

The findings point to fragmented national practices, heavy reliance on non-EU suppliers, and major vulnerabilities linked to remote maintenance and the absence of harmonised security protocols. The assessment identifies 13 risk scenarios, with the top risks being: over-dependency on single or limited manufacturers (vendor lock-in, high-risk suppliers); authorised/unauthorised access during maintenance or installation (including remote); malware compromising equipment, data integrity, and connected systems. Risks increase in interconnected environments (airports, ports, EU Customs Data Hub).

2.3 Drones

Drones are reshaping the future of the EU's economy and society, with far-reaching consequences for transport, trade, and services. As numbers increase and their technological capabilities advance, including improvements in speed, agility, range, payload capacity, and sensor precision, as well as the integration of Artificial Intelligence, it is essential to acknowledge the potential associated with their misuse. In order to harness the benefits of drones and their legitimate and lawful uses, it is therefore crucial to address the threats they pose in terms of unlawful, irregular, or malicious activities, and to mitigate these risks.

The occurrence of incidents involving drones of unknown origin near infrastructure, including airports, poses a particular challenge to the EU's readiness and ability to prevent future incidents.⁴ The presence of drones near sensitive areas also raises concerns about espionage thereby increasing the level of security tension. In response, the Commission has been developing in 2025 an Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security, aimed at strengthening the prevent-detect-response approach to mitigate the threats posed by drones and enhance the Union's preparedness to respond to incidents.

⁴ In 2025, suspensions of flight operations due to drones were reported for example in Copenhagen, Munich, Berlin and Brussels.

3. RISK ASSESSMENTS

3.1 Conflict Zones

The EU Conflict Zone Alerting System continued to conduct regular quarterly risk assessments, led by the Integrated EU Aviation Security Risk Assessment Group, which comprises EU Member States, EU INTCEN, and EASA. The system's objective is to facilitate the sharing of risk assessments related to conflict zones affecting EU civil aviation in a timely manner, enabling effective risk mitigation. Ad hoc meetings are convened as needed to address urgent matters.

The group held four quarterly meetings in 2025 and five ad hoc urgent meetings. Four preparatory meetings with EU airline and airline associations took place. This led to the issuance of two new EASA Conflict Zone Information Bulletins (CZIBs), the withdrawal of four EASA CZIBs and the update of the remaining ones.⁵

The integrated EU aviation security risk assessment process also provided risk assessment capability and supported the decision-making process (risk mitigation) for air cargo security and aviation security standards.

4. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND SUPPLEMENTARY TOOLS

4.1 Legislative framework

Civil aviation remains an attractive target for hostile actors and countering this threat requires the implementation of proportionate, risk-based protective measures. The Commission and Member States are therefore constantly adjusting the mitigation measures to achieve the highest level of security while minimising adverse effects on operations.

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1998 was amended in May 2025 by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/920⁶. The latter introduced amendments that strengthen the detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards in the area of air cargo and mail security, so as to enhance resilience and ensure adequate mitigation of new threats. The objective was to increase prevention and detection of IED (improvised explosive devices) and IID (improvised incendiary devices) through the implementation of measures enhancing the visibility of information and data pertaining to the air cargo and mail being shipped by air, strengthening competences and skills of security personnel, as well as ensuring the separation of certain commodities during the acceptance before they are loaded on board the aircraft.

Modifications were also introduced to aviation security measures in the areas of training, certification and recertification of security personnel as well as on routine

⁵ <https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/air-operations/czibs>

⁶ For details, see Annex 2.

testing of security equipment. Some airports⁷ were removed from the lists of third countries recognised as applying security standards equivalent to the common basic standards on aviation security.

4.2 Union database on supply chain security

The Union database⁸ on supply chain security constitutes the only legal tool for consultation when accepting consignments from another regulated agent or from a known consignor. The same database also includes a list of approved civil aviation security equipment with ‘EU Stamp’ marking.

At the end of 2025, the database contained almost 40 000 records of regulated agents, known consignors, known suppliers of airport supplies, independent validators, ACC3 airlines, regulated suppliers, third country regulated agents and known consignors, security equipment, airports and users. Its availability rate was 99.95%, meaning that during the year 2025 it was unavailable for just over 4 hours in total.

4.3 Pre-Loading Advance Cargo Information (PLACI)

Economic operators responsible for bringing consignments by air into the Union customs territory (as destination or as a place of transit) from third countries have to submit electronically advance cargo information to EU customs. This data is analysed for civil aviation security purposes by the customs authorities of the first point of entry in the EU using the new customs import system (ICS2).

The outcome of the PLACI risk analysis may require the implementation of specific mitigating aviation security measures, including the possibility of a “Do Not Load” (DNL) instruction or referral. These must be applied by economic operators engaged in the EU in-bound supply chain before the consignment is loaded on board of an EU-bound flight.

In 2025 around 146 million PLACI filings were recorded. These led to about 990 requests for screening (RFS) being issued, but there were no requests for not loading the goods (DNL). The majority of these were related to express shipments, followed by postal and general air cargo.

⁷ Kangerlussuaq airport in Greenland, Guernsey, Isle of Man and Jersey airports in the United Kingdom and Ben Gurion airport in Israel.

⁸ <https://ksda.ec.europa.eu/>

5. INSPECTIONS AND OTHER COMPLIANCE MONITORING ACTIVITIES

5.1 General

Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 aims at preventing unlawful interference with civil aviation in order to protect persons and goods. While this Regulation requires Member States to regularly monitor compliance in implementing the common basic aviation security standards by airports, air carriers and other entities and to ensure the swift detection and correction of failures, the role given to the Commission by the legislator is to monitor the effective implementation by the EU/EEA⁹ Member States of this legal requirement.

Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 requires the Commission to conduct inspections and, as appropriate, to make recommendations to improve aviation security. To fulfil this monitoring objective, the Commission's oversight system covers Member States' activities in setting up, maintaining, and applying an effective national civil aviation security programme and an effective national civil aviation quality control programme.

To this end, the Commission operates a two-layer system of compliance monitoring, i.e. its own inspections complemented by the assessment of Member States' annual reports on national monitoring activities.

Since 2010, the compliance rate identified during Commission inspections has remained stable at around 80%. However, effective implementation of some measures leaves room for improvement and requires continued efforts by the industry stakeholders, appropriate authorities and the Commission.

5.2 Frequency and scope of the inspections

The Commission carries out inspections of Member States' aviation security administrations (the 'appropriate authorities' as defined in Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 300/2008), as well as inspections of airports, operators and entities applying aviation security standards.

The number, frequency and scope of these inspections are established in the strategy of the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) for monitoring the implementation of EU aviation security standards. It takes into consideration the level of aviation activity in each Member State, a representative sample of the airport operations type, their level of compliance in implementing the aviation security regulations, results of previous Commission inspections, assessments of national

⁹ European Economic Area: 27 EU Member States, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) is responsible for conducting aviation security inspections in Norway and Iceland. The Commission conducts aviation security inspections in Switzerland based on a bilateral agreement.

annual quality control reports, security incidents ('acts of unlawful interference'), threat levels and other factors and assessments.

To provide the Commission with adequate assurances on the compliance level of Member States, a multiannual monitoring approach is used. As such, evidence is acquired concerning the application of Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 and its implementing legislation by every Member State in a cycle of two years, by means of either an inspection of its appropriate authority or an inspection of at least one of its airports.

In addition, evidence of the application of the common basic standards on aviation security is obtained in a cycle of five years by a selection of at least 15% of all EU airports falling under Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, including the largest airport in terms of passenger volumes in every Member State. The inspections carried out by the Commission at selected airports constitute a strong indicator of the overall compliance level in each Member State.

5.3 Procedures and methodology for inspections

Commission Regulation (EU) No 72/2010¹⁰ lays down the procedures for conducting Commission inspections in the field of aviation security. It includes, *inter alia*, provisions for the qualification and powers of Commission inspectors.¹¹

The methodology used to conduct the inspections has been developed in close cooperation with Member States' aviation security authorities and is based on the verification of the effective implementation of security measures.

5.4 Inspections carried out by the Commission

The Commission had an active team of seven full time aviation security inspectors, supported by a pool of some 70 national auditors nominated by Member States and who qualify for participation in Commission inspections.

Engaging national auditors in Commission inspections also contribute to a peer review system and allows spreading methodologies and best practices across Member States and associated countries.¹²

To provide Member States with feedback from inspections, promote transparency and harmonise compliance monitoring methodologies, the Commission organised an annual meeting and training of the national auditors in October 2025.

¹⁰ Commission Regulation (EU) No 72/2010 of 26 January 2010 laying down procedures for conducting Commission inspections in the field of aviation security (OJ L 23, 27.1.2010, p. 1).

¹¹ See Articles 4 and 5.

¹² See Annex 1 for a summary of all Commission and ESA compliance monitoring activities in 2025.

5.4.1 Inspections of national appropriate authorities

The inspections of appropriate authorities aim at verifying whether Member States have the necessary tools – including a national quality control programme, legal authority and appropriate resources – to be able to adequately implement EU aviation security legislation. As part of its seventh cycle of appropriate authority inspections, the Commission inspected 7 Member States during 2025.

The Member States inspected in 2025 kept their national aviation security programmes in line with legislative changes. Most of the national quality control programmes were also found to be fully aligned with the Commission Regulation (EU) No 18/2010. In all Member States, it was noted that airports, air carriers and entities with security responsibilities faced certain challenges in updating and maintaining security programmes in line with the Union legislation and with the national aviation security programmes, and also in monitoring thereof.

Requirements for recruitment, training, approval or/and certification, qualification of instructors and independent validators when applicable were mostly transposed into national training programmes of the inspected Member States. However, there is still room for improvement in the standardisation of the certification and recertification of x-ray operators.

In some Member States, the established frequencies and scopes for the monitoring of airports, air carriers and some entities with security responsibilities were not always respected by the appropriate authority. Furthermore, in some cases, not enough tests were performed in all required areas. In addition, the Commission also identified a need to improve the implementation of the methodology required for the inspections, in areas such as reporting of national compliance monitoring, the harmonisation of reporting of test results, directly linked security measures¹³ covered during the inspections and the classification of compliance.

All Member States provided their appropriate authorities with the necessary enforcement powers for monitoring and enforcing all requirements of the Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 and its implementing acts and most of them ensured that a sufficient number of auditors was available for performing compliance monitoring activities. Finally, airport on-site verifications revealed that the effectiveness of national monitoring activities remains an area for further improvement in all Member States inspected.

5.4.2 Initial inspections at airports

In 2025, the Commission carried out 12 initial airport inspections aiming at verifying if the appropriate authority adequately monitors the effective implementation of aviation security measures and is capable of swiftly detecting and rectifying potential

¹³ Two or more requirements that are so closely integrated that the effectiveness of one cannot be adequately assessed without considering the others.

deficiencies. Any deficiency identified by Commission inspectors must be rectified within an established timeframe. Inspection reports are shared among all Member States.

After the 16th year of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, the inspection results reflect the efforts made by appropriate authorities and the industry. Most of the security requirements continue to be correctly implemented. However, the inspections highlighted areas where further improvement can still be achieved. These include access control, screening, cyber security, aircraft security searches, security controls for supplies, as well as implementation of processes related to certification.

5.4.3 Follow-up inspections

In accordance with Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 72/2010, the Commission routinely carries out a limited number of follow-up inspections. Such inspections are scheduled when several serious deficiencies have been identified during the initial inspection, but also on a random basis to verify that appropriate authorities have the necessary powers to require rectification of deficiencies within set timeframes. In 2025, no follow-up inspections were carried out.

5.5 Assessments of Member States' annual quality control report

Point 18 of the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 requires Member States to annually submit a report to the Commission on the measures taken to fulfil their obligations and on the aviation security situation at their airports.

The assessment of these reports, in addition to its own regular inspections, provides a tool for the Commission to closely follow the implementation of national quality control measures. This, in turn, allows for swift detection and correction of deficiencies in each Member State.

The assessment includes an analysis of regular monitoring of airports, air carriers and other entities with aviation security responsibilities, as well as time spent by the auditors in the field, scope and frequencies of a suitable mixture of compliance monitoring activities, national compliance levels, follow-up activities and the use of enforcement powers.

The quality of annual reports and information provided by Member States remains constant and further harmonisation was achieved during 2025.

A formal comprehensive evaluation was sent to the Member States highlighting, where needed, suggestions on how to improve or better tailor the national efforts.

5.6 Assessments of third country airports

The Commission conducts assessments in the context of One Stop Security (OSS) arrangements between the EU and third countries. The purpose is to confirm that implementation of certain security measures continues to be of an equivalent standard

to the implementation of EU aviation security legislation. In 2025, three assessments were conducted, respectively, in the United States, the Faroe Islands and the United Kingdom.

5.7 Article 15 cases and legal proceedings

If the identified deficiencies in the implementation of security measures at an airport are serious enough as to have a significant impact on the overall level of civil aviation security in the Union, the Commission will activate Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 72/2010. This means that the appropriate authorities of all Member States are alerted to the situation, and that flights arriving from the airport subjected to Article 15 shall be treated as arriving from a third country, resulting in the obligation for the receiving airports to implement compensatory security measures in respect of arriving transfer passengers and their baggage, as well as the aircraft on which they arrived. No such case was initiated in 2025.

The Commission also has the possibility to open infringement proceedings in accordance with Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, particularly in cases of prolonged non-rectification or recurrence of deficiencies. In 2025, no such proceedings were launched.

6. INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE

6.1 General

The Commission continued its contribution to global aviation security by engaging with international bodies, such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), working closely with Member States to ensure co-ordinated EU positions. Dialogues were also held with key like-minded partners, such as the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and Singapore.

6.2 International bodies

The EU actively participated, as an observer, in the annual meeting of the ICAO Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP/36), which took place from 7 to 11 April 2025 as well as in the fourth meeting of the ICAO Cybersecurity Panel (CYSECP/4), which took place from 2 to 6 June 2025.

The outcomes of the 42nd ICAO Assembly (23 September – 3 October 2025) on security, cyber, and conflict zone matters reflected EU stated objectives. These included a new Assembly Resolution on Conflict Zones; a revised Aviation Security Resolution referring to evolving threats, including from sophisticated actors, and a call for intensified efforts to secure the air cargo and the mail system; a revised Resolution on Cybersecurity addressing cyber threats and emphasising the need to address cyber risks holistically; and an Assembly endorsement of the European Group's proposal to organise a High-Level Aviation Security Conference.

6.3 Third countries

In application of Article 435 of the EU/UK Trade Cooperation Agreement, cooperation on aviation security matters covers exchange of information, discussion and sharing of best practices and development of cooperation arrangements between technical experts. The 6th EU-U.K. Aviation Security Cooperation Meeting took place on 1 April and the 7th EU-U.K. Aviation Security Cooperation Meeting on 17 October 2025.

The EU-US Transportation Security Cooperation Group (TSCG) aims at fostering co-operation in several areas of mutual interest. It ensures the continued functioning of One Stop Security (OSS) arrangements and of the mutual recognition of the respective EU and US air cargo and mail security regimes. No meeting of the TSCG was organised in 2025, but technical cooperation continued throughout the year.

In conformity with EU law, the Commission has established OSS arrangements recognising security standards applied in some third countries, or airports of third countries, as equivalent to EU standards.¹⁴ No new OSS arrangements were concluded in 2025.

Regarding capacity building, the “Civil Aviation Security in Africa, Asia and the Middle East” project (CASE II), funded by the European Commission with a budget of EUR 8 million and implemented by ECAC, continued in 2025. Activities delivered by aviation security experts included workshops, webinars and bilateral in-country activities.¹⁵ The overall objective of CASE II was to counter the threat of terrorism to civil aviation by partnering with States in the three regions, to strengthen their aviation security regimes.¹⁶

7. CONCLUSIONS

For commercial aviation to thrive, it is essential to safeguard the security of operations both in the air and on the ground. In 2025, the European Commission, in collaboration with the Member States, took significant actions to ensure that existing implementing

¹⁴ The EU has OSS arrangements with the US, Canada, Singapore, Montenegro, Serbia and the UK.

¹⁵ From 1 January to 30 November 2025 (end date), the CASE II project delivered 56 activities (including 34 bilateral training activities, eight mentoring activities, six multilateral activities, five regional workshops, two interregional workshops and one webinar) to the benefit of 950 participants, showing a high rate of implementation until the end of the project. In total, 264 in-country and remote activities have been delivered since the Project's inception for the benefit of 89 Partner States and ECAC/EU Member States. More information on CASE II: <https://www.ecac-ceac.org/activities/security/eu-ecac-case-ii-project>

¹⁶ The methodology used to select Partner States is based on cumulative criteria and presents opportunities for improvement to ensure that relevant factors are taken into consideration, such as the level of threat, the level of security measures in each Partner State, and whether these Partner States have any direct flights to an EU Member State. This approach was combined with regular coordination with Member States or other implementing agencies to avoid duplication of capacity-building initiatives and increase synergy.

legislation in the field of aviation security, was adapted to the evolution of the threat and risk environment. Measures were adopted to strengthen the air cargo supply chain and proposals were made to establish an EU system for aviation security occurrence reporting and the timely sharing of security information to mitigate emerging threats.

Worked also continued in 2025 on a new aviation security baseline that would fully exploit present and future technology potential in a manner that achieves the highest level of security while enhancing, to the greatest extent possible, the passenger experience.